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 Abstract  
The evaluation of the DPR's oversight function always considered not 
to represent the will of critical supervision of the people in almost every DPR's 
performance satisfaction survey. The DPR Committees institutionally the 
main actor of supervision, but has not been effective. 11 DPR committees 
compared to 113 work partners suspected to be one of the causes. Committees 
formed by DPR and can be adjusted according to needs. Based on a 
comparative approach on regulations in the US Congress and the British 
Parliament, it is recommended to narrow the oversight work by increasing the 
number of DPR committees to balance a large number of partners. The 
division of supervision work into more committees makes the scope of work 
narrow so that supervision is more focused. Changes in the arrangement of 
the number of committees in Law 17/2014 and the DPR 2014 Rules of Conduct 
need to be done by stating the maximum number of five working partners for 
each committee. The creativity of the committee to form sub-committees 
following needs must also be confirmed in the 2014 DPR Rules of Conduct. 
Such regulation is expected to make the performance of checks and balances 
between the DPR and the Government better assessed by the public as a 
unitary presidential government system, namely a presidential system that 
better represents the will of the people's supervision. 
 
Keywords: Committees, DPR/ Indonesian People’s Representative Council, 
Oversight Function, Presidential System, Regulate. 
Volume 13 Number 2, April-June 2019: pp. 129-150. 
Copyright © 2019 FIAT JUSTISIA. Faculty of Law, Lampung 
University, Bandarlampung, Lampung, Indonesia. ISSN: 
1978-5186 | e-ISSN: 2477-6238.Open Access: 
http://jurnal.fh.unila.ac.id/index.php/fiat 
 Fiat Justisia is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is 
properly cited. 
 





How to Cite: Zulkarnain Ridlwan, Zainal Arifin Mochtar, “Regulate DPR’s 
Committees: Making Indonesian Presidential System More Representative”, 
Fiat Justisia, 13 (2), (2019). 
 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25041/fiatjustisia.v13no2.1566     
 
A. Introduction 
The Expanse of states’ history outlined that the portrait of power 
psychologically constant to be perverted. Because the tendency of rulers to 
expand their power and distort the use of power far greater than the ability to 
keep an eye on themselves. Therefore the authorities, with the power in his 
hand, need to be monitored. In the context of state, government as rulers 
should be supervised and should feel watched particularly by the parliament.  
There is no agreement on the definition of parliamentary oversight, and 
so is the study of parliament; its understanding is still limited to theory1. There 
is little global analysis, which in principle done by Persson, et al., Treisman, 
Hope, Gerring and Thacker, and Lederman, et. al.2 Most of the research done 
on the scope of a particular country or region.3 These studies usually test the 
functions of the state parliament in general, and not focus solely or mainly on 
the oversight function. With more study of the oversight function in the United 
States, while fewer in other countries.4 
Olson and Mezey also McCubbins and Schwartz refer the oversight 
associated with a series of parliamentary activities undertaken to evaluate the 
                                                 
1 David M. Olson, “Legislatures and Administration in Oversight and Budgets: Constraints, 
Means and Executives.” in Rick Stapenhurst, et.al. (Eds), Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: 
A World Perspective, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, (2008), pp. 323-331. 
2 Torsten Persson, et.al. (1997). “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics Perspectives, 112, pp. 1163–1202; Daniel Treisman, (2000). “The 
Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study” Journal of Public Economics 76, 3:399–457; 
Kempe Ronald Hope, “Corruption and Development in Africa.” in Kempe Ronald Hope Sr. 
and Bornwell C. Chikulu (Eds.), Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from Country 
Case-Studies. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 17-39; John Gerring, and Strom Thacker, 
(2004). “Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of Unitism and Parliamentarism.” 
British Journal of Political Science, 34:295–330; Lederman, Daniel, et.al. (2005). 
“Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Do Matter.” Economics and Politics, 
17:1, p. 1–35. 
3 For example: Philip Norton and Nizam Ahmed. “Legislatures in Asia: Exploring Diversity.” 
in Philip Norton and Nizam Ahmed (Eds.), Legislatures in Developmental Perspective, 
London: Frank Cass, (1999), pp. 1-12; David M. Olson, and Philip Norton, (Eds.). The New 
Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe. London: Frank Cass, (1996). 
4 Frederick Stapenhurst, et.al,“Corruption and Legislatures”, Public Integrity, 16 (3), (2014), 
pp. 285-304. 
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policy implementation5, also includes programs run by the government6. In 
the literature about parliamentary oversight, also known several terms 
represent oversight mechanism such as ex-ante, ex-post, sporadic actions 
(politely called 'fire-alarm' oversight), routine actions (so-called 'police-patrol' 
oversight).7 
In the history of the Republic of Indonesia, DPR (Indonesian People's 
Representatives Council) and executive relations, particularly with the 
president, tend to be a mutually exclusive relationship.8 When the president is 
weak and has no effective power, DPR tends to function their authority more 
as a tool of political influence competition and bargain between parties. Not 
become effective power that is used to push for a settlement of the political 
problem. Conversely, if the executive, particularly the president, were strong, 
DPR tends only to be able to justify and legitimise policies taken by the 
executive. 
That first condition occurred during the parliamentary period 1950 until 
July 1959. The second condition began after the President’s decree on 5 of 
July 1959, passed during the whole time of the New Order. Which always 
visible, if DPR being weak, it became a justification tool of government 
policy. Conversely, if the Parliament being strong, it tempted to become a 
defender of his party.9 
Configuration of political parties as government supporters in today’s 
DPR similar to the dominance of government supporters in the New Order. 
The merger of three of five political parties (to the government) which had 
opposite each other in presidential elections, expressed concern at the fair will 
be at risk of forming oligarchy of power. It is needed to formulate the concept 
that political parties which are outside the government, although the numbers 
are small, can still bring optimal parliamentary oversight. So parliament with 
oversight functions can still be relied upon in overseeing the government by 
the people, not the dominance of the interests of ruling political parties.10  
                                                 
5 David M. Olson, and Michael L. Mezey, ed. Legislatures in the Policy Process: The Dilemmas 
of Economic Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1991); Mathew McCubbins and 
Thomas Schwarz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms”, 
American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1), (1984), pp.65–79. 
6 Allen Schick, “Congress and the Details of Administration.” Public Administration Review, 
36 (5), (1976). pp.16–528. 
7 McCubbins and Schwarz, Loc.Cit. 
8 Ignas Kleden, Menulis Politik: Indonesia sebagai Utopia (Political Writing: Indonesia as 
Utopia), Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, (2001), p. 157. 
9 Ibid., p. 158. 
10 As stated by Ridlwan and Nurbaningsih, even if the parliament opposition raises have not yet 
to be adopted within the Indonesian governance system, at least a revision of the law aimed at 
guaranteeing the members of parliament (MPs) to perform their role freely according to 
conscience. See: Zulkarnain Ridlwan and Enny Nurbaningsih, (2018), “Law Revision on 
Indonesian Parliament’s Oversight Function: Facing the Challenges of Democracy” in The 1st 




How is the condition of institutionalisation on current DPR oversight 
function and its relation to the strengthening public recognition upon 
Indonesian presidential’s representativeness? Recognition here means 
acknowledgement that something was authorised to be done11 or confirmation 
that an act done by another person was authorised12. Public recognition upon 
the presidential system, in this case, means people’s acknowledgement that 
the system is worthy and fit for public concerns.  
In that framework, the presidential system recognition by the public 
ought to be strengthened by the presence of parliamentary oversight. 
Certainly, in this case, effective parliamentary oversight is required, leading 
to an active-constructive frame of oversight. It is not parliamentary oversight 
that is carried out in negative-destructive terms. Nor is it apathetic-
compromising. Because the last two mentioned conditions will weaken the 
people’s recognition upon the presidential system. Weak, in this case, means 
a president who does not get recognition from the people.  
Both of those conditions, caused by the arbitrary presidency due to 
negative collaboration with the parliament, creates a state of compromise —
governance without the presence of a legislative body that carries out 
oversight. Or even because the ineffective presidential leadership due to 
destructive parliamentary oversight, will always be different from the 
president's step, which tends to be negative. 
Institutionally, DPR Committees are the main actors of oversight. 
Within it, DPR’s oversight activity upon government institutions conducted 
and should be well organised. However, based on many surveys of its 
performance, the DPR committees are considered not working well according 
to public expectation. Availability of committees that only amount to 11 
compared to its 113 work partners suspected to be one of the causes.  
17/2014 Law submit the authority to form a committee to the DPR 
itself. Amount and distribution of its partners can be adjusted according to 
needs. So whenever the DPR feels the need, the number of committees can be 
expanded. The question is, how many DPR committees are needed to carry 
out the oversight function over the extent of the work area of government 
agencies? What is the minimum number of DPR committees that must be 
regulated in the amendment to Law 17/2014 so that supervision can be held 
more effectively? 
Regulatory tracking methods are chosen by making comparisons. To 
find best practices in the relationship between parliamentary oversight and 
                                                 
International Conference on South East Asia Studies, KnE Social Sciences, (2016), pp.573–
593. 
11 Susan Ellis Wild (Legal Ed.), Webster’s New World Law Dictionary, NJ: Wiley Publishing, 
(2006), p. 217. 
12 Bryan A. Garner (Ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, St.Paul: West Group, (1999), p. 1277. 
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governmental execution by the government is pursued by making 
comparisons. Comparison method means learning from the experiences of 
other parties.13 The comparison provides a foundation to make a statement 
about the real data with regularly and to evaluate and interpret certain 
conditions substantive and theoretical.14 The comparison does a central role in 
the formation of the concept with a focus on the similarities and differences 
between cases. Comparisons are routinely used to test hypotheses and 
contribute inductive discovery of new hypotheses and to construct a theory.15  
The most common comparison of the legislature (parliament) focuses 
on the strength or weakness on the part of the institution.16 This paper takes 
the US and UK as comparisons. From the US as the pioneer country of the 
presidential system, examples will be taken of how the US House of 
Representatives’ oversight of government can be effective. Similarly, from 
the UK -especially British House of Commons- as the first country to run a 
model of parliamentary government will be adopted practices as well as 
instruments that can be adopted for the presidential government without 
changing the principles prevailing in the presidential system. This search 
focuses on developing institutional oversight functions, so the number of 




1. Indonesian Presidential System 
Broadly, the governance system adopted by the countries include the two 
systems, the parliamentary system and the presidential system. But in its 
development, there are also countries that adopted the combination of the two 
systems (quasi system).17 This classification saw from the nature of the 
relationship between bodies or organs that hold the state power. The 
parliamentary system is a system of government that most widely applied 
                                                 
13 Giovanni Sartori, “Comparing and Miscomparing”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3 (3), 
(1991), p. 245. 
14 Charles C. Ragin. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
Strategies, Berkeley: University of California Press Limited, (1987), p. 1. 
15 David Collier, “The Comparative Method”, in A. Finiftner (ed.), Political Science: The State 
of Discipline, Washington, D.C.: APSA, (1993), p. 105. 
16 Taiabur Rahman. Parliamentary Control and Government Accountability in South Asia: A 
comparative analysis of Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, Routledge Advances in South Asian 
Study. New York: Routledge, (2007), p. 31. 
17 José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, “Legislative-Executive Relations”, in Tom 
Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (Ed.). Comparative Constitutional Law, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, (2011), p. 212. 




throughout the world, of all variants of the system of government.18 In a simple 
distinction, the parliamentary and presidential system could be seen in the 
portrait of the relationship between the government and the parliament. If 
there is interdependence between the two, that is parliamentary, while the 
presidential interpreted if the government and parliament of each stand-
alone.19 
Soemantri, in line with Asshiddiqie, suggests a three-division system of 
government; parliamentary, presidential, and mixed government.20 According 
to Kusuma’s study, Indonesian’s government system different from the US 
presidential system, also different from the parliamentary system as in 
England, Indonesia’s system similar to Republic V of France.21 The executive-
legislative relationship can be seen in its mutual attraction, in a parliamentary 
system the executive can be imposed by parliament with a no-confidence vote. 
As control of that parliament actions, the executive may propose to the head 
of state to dissolve parliament. In the presidential system, the incumbent 
president cannot be imposed by parliament under normal circumstances. 
Nevertheless, a mechanism presidential impeachment available in abnormal 
conditions, with the reason of law violations, for instance. 
The so-called presidential system also can be identified when the 
executive not accountable to parliament. In a presidential system, cabinet not 
responsible collectively, but each minister individually responsible to the 
president. The presidential system also does not recognise the ultimate 
supremacy institution. As the core characteristic of the presidential system, 
the representative body does not have the ultimate supremacy upon the state. 
Indonesia has the experience changed between the presidential system 
of government and parliamentary. Based on several base criteria above, the 
current adopted system in Indonesia is presidential. The presidential system 
more precisely executed in Indonesia for some reason, the strongest one lead 
by Indonesia’s experienced government instability as happened in the 1950s 
and 2001. The presidential system has the presidential term to guarantee more 
stability because the government does not depend on the parliament. 
                                                 
18 Douglas V. Verney, “Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government”, in Arend 
Lijphart, Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
(1992), p. 31. 
19 Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation”, 
World Politics, 46 (1), (1993), pp. 1–22. 
20 Sri Soemantri, Pengantar Perbandingan Antar Hukum Tata Negara (Introduction to 
Comparative Constitutional Law). Jakarta: CV. Rajawali, (1981), pp. 76-80; in line with Jimly 
Asshiddiqie. Pokok-Pokok Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia Pasca Reformasi (Principles of 
Constitutional Law at the Indonesia Post-Reformation), Jakarta: Buana Ilmu Populer, (2007), 
p. 311. 
21 R.M. Ananda B. Kusuma, “Sistem Pemerintahan Indonesia (Indonesian Government 
System)”, Jurnal Konstitusi, 1 (1), (2004). p. 150. 
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2. DPR Oversight Function and Its Affecting Factors 
The existence of the parliament in the process of policy formation is very 
important22, especially in the role oppose or change the policy initiatives that 
come from the government23. A strong parliament makes decisions and takes 
action independently from the government in a parliamentary system. Access 
to information and expertise in policy from sources that are not associated 
with the government, which is usually in stable condition and the special 
committee of parliament, is generally regarded as the conditions necessary for 
a strong parliament any regime rule.24  
Parliamentary oversight defined as a review, monitoring and oversight 
of the government and the institutions of public, also includes the 
implementation of legislation and policies. Yamamoto stated the main 
functions of the parliamentary oversight could be described as follows:25 1) to 
detect and prevent abuse, arbitrary behaviour, or illegal and unconstitutional 
behaviour from the government and public institutions; 2) to maintain the 
government's account of how the taxpayers' money is used; 3) to ensure that 
the measures announced by the government and approved by parliament 
actually delivered; and 4) to improve the transparency of government 
enforcement and improving public confidence in the government, because this 
is a condition of effective policy. 
Based on the reference, one of several factors that affect the function of 
parliamentary oversight influenced by the composition of institutional factors, 
tools, and dependence.26 Committees and subcommittees have been an 
effective oversight tool in a presidential system and a parliamentary system. 
It could be traced from the various retention of the US Congress and the 
British Parliament. By the committees and subcommittees, the oversight 
function conducted without abandon another legislative function. As asserted 
by Petersen, select committees (in British Parliament and the U.S. House) 
                                                 
22 M. Mezey. Comparative Legislatures, Durham: Duke University Press, (1979), pp. 23. 
23 N.W. Polsby. “Legislatures”, in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of 
Political Science, Vol. 5. (Reading: Addition-Wesley, 1975), p. 277; M. Mezey. Comparative... 
Op.Cit, p. 26-27. 
24 J.M. Carey. “Parties, Coalitions and the Chilean Congress in the 1990s”, in M. Scott and B. 
Nacif (Eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
(2002), p. 153; Philip Norton, “The Legislative Powers of Parliaments”, in C. Flinterman, A.W. 
Herings and L. Waddington (Eds.). The Evolving Role of Parliaments in Europe. Antwerpen: 
Maklu Uitgevers, (1994), pp. 15-35; Kaare Strøm, “Parliamentary Committees in European 
Democracies”, Journal of Legislative Studies, 4 (1), (1998), pp. 20–59. 
25 Hironori Yamamoto, Tools for Parliamentary Oversight: A Comparative Study of 88 
National Parliaments, Switzerland: Inter-Parliament Union, (2007), pp. 9-10. 
26 B. Rockman. ‘Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight’, in Loewenburg, 
G., Patterson, S. & Jewell, M. (Eds.) Handbook of Legislative Research. Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, (1985), pp. 519-572. 




review executive department operations (there is generally one select 
committee for each department).27 In DPR, the availability of committees is 
not equal to the number of government departments, as explained in the table 
below:  
 














Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Communication and 
Information, TNI Commander, TNI 
Headquarters (Army, Navy and Air 
Force), National Defense Council, 
National Defense Institution, State 
Intelligence Agency, State Password 
Institution, LKBN Antara Public 
Company, Central Information 
Committee, Indonesian Broadcasting 
Committee, TVRI (Television), Radio 









Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of 
State Secretariat, Ministry of Agrarian and 
Spatial Planning of the National Land 
Agency, Cabinet Secretariat, 
Ombudsman, General Election 
Committee, Election Supervisory 
Agency, Ministry of Administrative 
Reform - Bureaucratic Reform, State Civil 
Service Agency, State Administration 
Agency, National Archives of the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
12 
                                                 
27 R. Eric Petersen. “Parliament and Congress: A Brief Comparison of the British House of 
Commons and the U.S. House of Representatives”, Congressional Research Service, Updated 
May 19, 2005. 
28 http://dpr.go.id/akd/komisi. 
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Ministry of Law and Human Rights, 
Attorney General's Office, National 
Police, Corruption Eradication 
Committee, National Human Rights 
Committee, National Law Committee, 
Secretary General of the Supreme Court, 
Secretary General of the Constitutional 
Court, Secretary General of the House, 
Secretary General of the People's 
Consultative Assembly, Secretary 
General of the Regional Representatives 
Council, Financial Transaction Reports 
and Analysis Center, Institutions 
Protection of Witnesses and Victims, 
National Narcotics Agency, National 









Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry, Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Logistics 









Ministry of Public Works and Housing, 
Ministry of Transportation, Meteorology, 
Climatology and Geophysics Agency, 
National Search and Relief Agency, 
Sidoarjo Mud Prevention Agency, 
Surabaya Madura Development Agency, 
Ministry of Village, Development of 








Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Trade, 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro, 
Small and Medium Enterprises, Ministry 
of State-Owned Enterprises, Investment 
Coordinating Board, National 
Standardization Agency, National 
11 




Consumer Protection Agency, Business 
Competition Supervisory Committee, 
Batam Excess Free Trade Zone and Free 








The Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, Ministry of Research, 
Technology and Higher Education, 
Agency for the Assessment and 
Application of Technology, Nuclear 
Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy 
Supervisory Agency, Geospatial 
Coordination Agency, Regulatory 
Agency for Downstream Oil and Gas, 
Special Oil and Gas Work Unit, National 
Aeronautics and Space Agency, Institute 
of Sciences Indonesian Knowledge, 
Eikjman Institute, National Research 
Council, National Energy Council, 








Ministry of Religion, Ministry of Social 
Affairs, Ministry of Women's 
Empowerment and Child Protection, 
Indonesian Child Protection Committee, 
National Disaster Management Agency, 







Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Manpower, National Population and 
Family Planning Agency, Food and Drug 
Supervisory Agency, National Agency for 
Placement and Protection of Workers, 
Health Social Security Organizing 
Agency, Health Social Security 
Organizing Agency - Employment 
7 
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Ministry of Education and Culture, 
Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Youth 





Ministry of Finance, National 
Development Planning Agency, Financial 
and Development Supervisory Agency, 
Central Statistics Agency, Secretary 
General of the Audit Board, Bank 
Indonesia, Banks, Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions, Indonesian Export Financing 
Institutions, Government Goods and 
Services Procurement Institutions, 





Table 1 shows that the work of 11 DPR committees is not evenly 
distributed, and it even clear that there is an imbalance of oversight workloads. 
For example, Committee X, which only has four government institutions as 
the scope of oversight, while Committee I has 18. Such quantity also explains 
that the oversight work of each committee will differ in quality. Committees 
that have little work area are more likely to present quality oversight because 
of fewer focus points. That work scope condition also makes routine oversight 
is the most dominant function carried out by DPR Members. Besides, the DPR 
members should not only focus more on the supervisory function, because 
there are legislative functions and budget functions that require the same 
portion of attention. 
 
3. The institutionalisation of Committee and Subcommittee 
A survey of 80s state legislature mentions that the effectiveness of 
parliamentary oversight tools varies according to the shape of the country.29 
In the presidential country, the most important tool are the committee, plenary 
hearings, and the ombudsman; in the semi-presidential country, the most 
important tool is the session of questions, interpellation, and ombudsman, and 
                                                 
29 Hironori Yamamoto. Loc.Cit.; Riccardo Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, R. 2004. “Tools for 
Legislative Oversight: an Empirical Investigation”, Quaderni di Scienza Politica/ Notebook of 
Political Science, 11 (1). 




in the parliamentary country the most important tools are interpellation.30 
Norton asserts that the Parliament with strong institutionalisation has a greater 
ability to force the government than the weak parliament in its 
institutionalisation.31 The core of institutionalisation is specialisation through 
committees. 
There is no way to consider the best instrument to balance the executive 
relationship with parliament. But it has been widely known that a way to 
strengthen the parliament while still keeping the executive from weakening, 
by maximising the function of committees.32 The Committee gave parliament 
to (simultaneously) perform many functions that may –without it- cannot be 
implemented.33 For example, parliamentary committees help reduce the 
workload and carry out different functions more efficiently. Committees also 
guided the legislation and provide the essential tools in the framework of 
government oversight. Committees can also offer MPs a variety of advantages 
and opportunities as increase their capacity in specialisation in the realm of 
policy,34 providing tools for them to continue to be busy and feel useful,35 and 
make sure they become more active and profitable participation in the 
governance process.36 The main thing has been understood; the committee 
became one of the most effective tools to bolster the authority of parliament 
to deal with the executive.37 
Countries with a well-established system of government would have a 
parliamentary institutional design that has stabilised, including in terms of the 
existence of the committees and subcommittees in it. Which Indonesia can 
take lessons either in the institutionalisation of committees and subcommittees 
in the parliament? The two different models with different government 
systems might be the references. The examples of institutional design from 
                                                 
30 Frederick Stapenhurst, et.al. Loc.Cit. 
31 Norton Philip, “Conclusion: Do Parliaments Make a Difference”, in Philip Norton (Ed.), 
Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe, London: Frank Cass, (1998), p. 196. 
32 Anthony King. ‘How To Strengthen Legislatures-Assuming That We Want To’ in Norman 
Ornstein (ed), The Role of the Legislature in Western Democracies, Washington: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, (1981), pp. 77-89; Nizam Ahmed. (2010). 
“Parliamentary Committees and Parliamentary Government in Bangladesh”, Contemporary 
South Asia, 10 (1), pp. 11-36. 
33 Susan Benda. “Committees In Legislatures: A Division of Labour” in Lawrence Longley and 
Attila Agh (Eds.). The Changing Roles of Parliamentary Committees. Appleton: Research 
Committee of Legislative Specialists, International Political Science Association, (1997), p. 17. 
34 Hugh Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy. Melbourne: Macmillan, (1978), p. 406. 
35 Michael Rush, “Parliamentary committees and parliamentary government: the British and 
Canadian experiences”, The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 20 (2), 
(1982), p. 151. 
36 Michael Jogerst, Reform in the British House of Commons, Lexington: The University of 
Kentucky Press, (1993), p. 26. 
37 Rod Hague & Martin Harrop. Comparative Government. London: Macmillan, (1982), p. 157. 
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the two countries are expected to represent better the critical supervision of 
the Indonesian people who represent the ideals of democracy in Indonesia.38 
US model (Presidential) and British model (Parliamentary) in exercising 
congressional/ parliamentary oversight through committees and 
subcommittees. 
 
a. First, US Model.  
The US Constitution generally acknowledged as a strong expression of 
the doctrine of separation power. Separation of power, a doctrine that 
establishes the formation of separate branches of government, with clear and 
limited powers. In that system, complete independence of executive, 
legislative and judicial functions is formed while maintaining the overlapping 
forces between them to ensure that they examine and balance each other.39 
The drafters of the US Constitution distribute power among three branches of 
the federal government: legislative, executive and judicial.  
Those federal government bound by higher constitutional law, which 
guides and limits the use of power to protect people's freedoms and avoid 
tyranny.40 Congress is the identity of the Senate and the House, even though 
most of their work is independent. Members of Congress bring local concerns 
to the national debate, and they work to ensure that the specific needs and 
concerns of their constituents are dressed in the national legislature.41  
Congress does an important role in the functioning of the executive 
branch. Its responsibilities range from counting electoral votes, providing 
funds for the executive branch, and monitoring the implementation of laws. 
The Senate has the power to confirm executive appointments. Both the House 
and Senate can launch investigations into executive activities, and both 
chambers work together to seek the impeachment and conviction of top 
officials accused of wrongdoing.42 Congress has delegated to the executive 
branch broad authority over agencies and programs it has created. Its oversight 
power helps ensure that the executive branch performs as Congress intends.  
Hearings and investigations, the most publicised form of oversight, 
provide some of the most colourful moments on Capitol Hill, as seen in the 
                                                 
38 Zulkarnain Ridlwan. “Cita Demokrasi Indonesia dalam Politik Hukum Pengawasan Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Terhadap Pemerintah” [Indonesian democratic ideals in the legal politics 
supervision of the house of representatives of the government]. Jurnal Konstitusi, 12 (2), 
(2015), pp.305–327. 
39 Craig Calhoun, (Ed.). Dictionary of the Social Science, New York: Oxford University Press, 
(2002), p. 435. 
40 John J. Patrick, et.al, The Oxford guide to the United States government, New York: Oxford 
University Press, (2001), pp. 585-586. 
41 Ibid., p. 140. 
42 David R. Tarr & Ann O’Connor (Eds.) Congress A to Z, Fourth Edition, Washington DC: 
CQ Press, (2003), p. 156. 




water-gate scandal, Iran-contra affair, and the impeachment of President Bill 
Clinton. Members of Congress have been known to use the subpoena power 
of a committee to compel executive branch officials to testify or to produce 
documents. Lawmakers also exercise their oversight function through 
informal contacts with executive officials, as well as statements made in 
committees and conference reports also during hearings and floor debate. 
Staffs of individual members of Congress conduct ongoing oversight through 
casework – the handling of constituent questions and problems regarding 
agency actions.43 
US Congress developed an oversight committee which established or 
assigned the duty of overseeing the administration of the laws. Congress 
vested the “watchdog” responsibility in the standing committees, each 
responsible within its Jurisdiction for overseeing the execution of laws.44 
Besides being known, there are investigative committees, legislative 
committees that carry out fact-finding roles as assistance for the law-making 
process. The investigative committee can force witnesses to attend and 
produce relevant material. Investigations carried out by special committees 
made for that purpose.  
Increasingly, Congress has relied on investigations as a means of 
seeking to regain its position of power vis-a-vis the executive branch, which 
has steadily gained in relative power during this Century.45 Committees 
conduct investigations that highlight national problems or disclose official 
wrongdoing. They are also responsible for congressional oversight of 
government programs and agencies. By the 104th Congress (1995-1997), 
most committees could have no more than five subcommittees and most 
member no more than four subcommittee assignments. At the beginning of 
the 106th Congress (1999-2001), the House changes its rules to allow 
committees to add the sixth subcommittee if one of its subcommittees dealt 
with oversight. In the 108th Congress, subcommittees in the House and Senate 




3) Armed Services 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 329. 
44 Jack C. Plano & Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary, Eleventh Edition, 
Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, (2002), p. 192. 
45 Ibid., p. 168. 
46 Tarr and O’Connor, Op.Cit., pp. 90-92. 
47 See: https://www.congress.gov/committees, Accessed Februari 2019. See also: Rule X 
Organization of Committees” in Karen L. Hass (Prepared by.) Rules of the House of 
Representatives – 114th Congress, Clerk of the House of Representatives, January 6, (2015), 
pp. 6-9. 
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4) Budget 
5) Education and Labor 
6) Energy and Trade 
7) Ethics 
8) Financial Services 
9) Foreign Affairs 
10) Homeland Security 
11) Housing 
12) Court 
13) Natural Resources 
14) Government Oversight and Reform 
15) Rules 
16) Science, Space and Technology 
17) Small Trade 
18) Transportation and Infrastructure 
19) Veteran Affairs 
20) State Finance 
The division of members in most of the US Congress are divided on 
work across a wide range of committees and sub-committees.48 The 
cornerstone of a wide discussion on institutional theory, it can be hypothesised 
that the rules/ standard operating procedures, as well as the history of the 
stability and sustainability of the institution, is vital for the performance of the 
institution. The performance of agencies is the role of parliamentary 
committees in ensuring government accountability.49 Jeff Stier wrote in 
Forbes page, highlighting the importance of the oversight of the US Congress 
as a key element of checks and balances that prevent the accumulation of 
power also an abuse of power in all parts of government.50 
According to Madjid, Indonesia, since the beginning has been taking 
the US as an example of the implementation of the presidential system.51 With 
the example of the US, the nation founders also designed the implementation 
of democracy with the periodic presidential government. They also adhere to 
the principles of civil liberties, namely freedom of expression, assembly, and 
association. Overall insights, it also has become a common spirit every 
Constitution that has ever had throughout Indonesia’s history, such as 
Constitution of the Republic of United States of Indonesia (1949-1950) and 
                                                 
48 Lewis A. Froman Jr, “Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics 
of Congress”, The American Political Science Review, 62 (2), (1968), pp. 523. 
49 Taiabur Rahman, Op.Cit., p. 22. 
50 Jeff Stier, “Checks and Balances ari Critical to Public Health”, Opinion on Forbes, 28 Juli 
2016, Washington DC: National Center for Public Policy Research.  
51 Nurcholish Madjid, Indonesia Kita, (Our Indonesia), Jakarta: Gramedia, (2004), pp. 88-89. 




the Provisional Constitution of Indonesia (1950-1959), and 1945 Constitution 
after amendments (1999-2002) itself, which is now in effect. 
State practice in the United States in the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature as called by Richard E. Neustadt as the 
"separated institutions sharing powers".52 So that, although separate, Congress 
and the president need each other. However, dissent or bitter rhetoric, they 
will immediately look for a variety of compromises so that the system can run. 
Congress also has the important responsibility of oversight of executive 
branch activities to ensure that its legislative intent is being carried out and to 
remedy the condition.53 The separation of powers that characterises the 
American political system imposes real accountability on the Executive. 
While in parliamentary democracies often have a looser concept of 
accountability with less separate powers than concentrated, especially 
between the Legislative and Executive Bodies.54 
 
b. Second, British Model.  
Based on the parliamentary system, the British Parliament put a special 
monitoring committee in each parliamentary committee to function properly. 
Departmental select committees, established in 1979 and comprising 
backbench MPs from all the parliamentary parties, scrutinise each government 
department’s policies, activities and spending. There are currently nineteen 
committees, each shadowing the work of a major government department. 
They generally conduct inquiries on specific departmental issues and publish 
reports, to which the government must respond. Often colloquially called 
‘watchdog’ committees, they have been called the single most important 
weapon of increased parliamentary influence in the twentieth century.55 The 
division of work of the committee in the House of Commons as follows:56 
1) Business, Business Organizations and Regulatory Reform 
2) Children, Schools and Families 
3) Local Community and Government 
4) Culture, Media and Sports 
5) Defence 
6) Environment, Food and Village Affairs 
7) Environmental Audit 
                                                 
52 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of 
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan, New York: Free Press, (1990), as cited by Michael 
Nelson (Ed.), The Presidency A to Z, Washington: CQ Press, (2003), p. 100. 
53 Ibid., p. 106. 
54 Harshan Kumarasingham, “Exporting Executive Accountability? Westminster Legacies of 
Executive Power”, Parliamentary Affairs, 66, (2013), p. 580. 
55 Moyra Grant, The UK Parliament, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, (2009), p. 126. 
56 See: www.parliament.uk/about/how/committees/, accessed on Februari 2019. 
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8) Foreign Affairs 
9) Health 
10) Domestic Affairs 
11) Innovation, Higher Education, and Skills 
12) International Development 
13) Justice 
14) Northern Ireland Affairs 
15) Scottish Affairs 
16) Transportation 
17) Treasury 
18) Wales Affairs 
19) Employment and Retirement 
As stated by Benton and Russel, although standing committees can be 
influential in key policy areas, they also play a role in drawing attention to 
specific or neglected issues that may not get the minister's attention 
adequately.57 The committee can encourage certain issues to become the 
ministry's agenda. The committee can also be a bridge of communication 
between government ministries. For this reason, Committee investigations are 
used to ensure that ministries weigh their policy options better. Even in some 
cases, the committee offers stronger openness than the media, or outside 
groups because the government has to respond to their recommendations 
formally.  
The ability of special committees in the British Parliament to expose 
poor policymaking in the public arena is carried out by calling witnesses. This 
condition motivated officials, and ministers, to ensure that their policies were 
watertight.58 Compliance with the committee due to its deep research on 
policy. Blondel described it as a preventative measure, so ministers had to ask 
themselves how elected committees in parliament tend to react.59 So, it has 
been agreed that committee consultations are very important, as also stated by 
Power and Khmelko.60  
 
C. Conclusion 
Comparative results from the US model were taken, the Executive’s 
respect to the call of the House’s Select Committees in the process of oversight 
                                                 
57 Meghan Benton & Meg Russell, “Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight 
Committees: The Select Committees in the British House of Commons”, Journal of 
Parliamentary Affairs, 66, (2013), pp. 772-797. 
58 Ibid., p. 790-791. 
59 Ibid., p. 792. 
60 See: Greg Power. Global Parliamentary Report; The changing nature of parliamentary 
representative, Denmark: UNDP and IPU, (2012), pp. 32-33; I. S. Khmelko, et.al. (2010). 
“Committees and Legislative Strengthening: The Growing Influence of Committees in 
Ukraine’s Legislative Process”. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 1 (16), (2010), pp. 73-95. 




of the government significantly influence the oversight result. From the 
British model, parliamentary oversight exercised in sub-committees, by that 
oversight can be focused, and through a simpler administrative process. 
Oversight can be done more effectively because parliamentarians have 
focused on the special work of oversight within the sub-committee.  
DPR can follow the pattern of oversight by shrinking its workspace into 
sub-committees in each committee. Then in each DPR committee, there will 
be a special sub-committee to supervise. This way, also, will make localisation 
and isolation in the sub-committee of oversight, also can divide the focus of 
the DPR work, which also has the function of budget and the function of 
legislation. Evaluation of DPR’s legislation function in the last two periods of 
DPR complained about its poor performance. Whereas as stated by many 
experts, the construction of the constitution of Indonesia after the amendment 
of the 1945 Constitution (1999-2002) emphasized the DPR on its legislative 
function rather than the function of budget and supervisory function because 
the oversight function was assisted by the presence of Regional Representative 
Council and Constitutional Court as a new state institution. 
Therefore, to strengthen public recognition on the presidential system 
through the DPR’s oversight function, need to be regulated in the MD3 Act, 
specifically in the amendment to 17/2014 Act of specialisation on the 
committee work area. The division of labour in only 11 DPR committees 
cannot balance the ministry's work area. The many working areas of the 
ministry, which are divided into 34 departments, make the DPR's oversight 
work ineffective. Moreover, the supervisory working area of the DPR 
committee also includes other government agencies besides the ministry.  
The division of existing working partners is not ideal to be able to 
present an effective institutional oversight function of the DPR. Inequality of 
workload between one committee and another makes oversight not optically 
worked. For this reason, revisions to 17/2014 Law should set a maximum limit 
of five working partners for each DPR committee. Then the total number of 
committees adjusts the distribution of workload. Thus, the division of labour 
supervision becomes more evenly distributed. With a narrower oversight 
working area, MPs could also perform in the legislation and budget function. 
With the main role of the DPR, the Indonesian presidential will be more 
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